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But there is a more subtle question of conflict of interest that derives 
directly from human bounded rationality.  The fact is, if we become 
involved in a particular activity and devote an important part of our lives 
to that activity, we will surely assign it a greater importance and value 
than we would have prior to our involvement with it.  
 
It’s very hard for us, sometimes, not to draw from such facts a conclusion 
that human beings are rather dishonest creatures … Yet most of the bias 
that arises from human occupations and preoccupations cannot be 
described correctly as rooted in dishonesty – which perhaps makes it more 
insidious than if it were. 
 
    -   Herbert A. Simon, 1983, pp. 95-96 
 
  
Herbert Simon’s perspective (1983) is broadly compatible with Moore, 
Loewenstein, Tanlu, and Bazerman’s (2003) recent research on the psychological aspects 
of conflict of interest in the context of auditor independence.  Moore et al. (2003) focuses 
primarily on the work on self-serving interpretations of fairness.  The current work 
broadens this theme, and develops a conceptual framework for understanding how 
unchecked psychological processes work against an objective assessment and allow us to 
act against personal, professional and normative expectations when conflicts of interest 
exist. 
Our work pursues a more comprehensive treatment of Simon’s informal notion 
through an integration of three critical psychological insights of the past century.  We 
begin with Simon’s own insight of bounded rationality, continue with subsequent insights 
offered in the work of Kahneman and Tversky regarding deviations from rationality, and 
then consider what we know today about the limitations of the conscious mind.  In our     Bounded Ethicality, 3 
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assessment, these three literatures together provide robust support for the view that 
conflict of interest that is not limited to explicit dishonesty.  Rather, unconscious acts of 
ethically questionable behavior are more prevalent, more insidious, and as such, more in 
need of attention.  The strands of these three insights weave together to form a powerful 
thread connecting what we know about basic human perception to cognitive, social, and 
ultimately, ethical consequences.  Thus, we develop the argument that the computational 
bounds on human cognition stretch further than previously assumed – they can influence 
the quality of ethical judgments, leading us to extend Simon’s phrase ‘bounded 
rationality’ to consider the possibility and consequence of  ‘bounded ethicality’.  
Bounded rationality refers to the limits on the quality of general decision-making, and  
bounded ethicality is a strand that is used to refer to the limits on the quality of decision-
making with ethical import.  In this chapter, we focus on the nature of bounded ethicality, 
and its psychological implications for recognizing conflicts of interest. 
We propose that bounded ethicality places a critical constraint on the quality of 
decision-making.  We focus on one consequence of bounded ethicality, the limitation in 
recognizing the ethical challenge inherent in a situation or decision, such as conflicts of 
interest.  Specifically, we argue that individuals view themselves as moral, competent, 
and deserving, and this view obstructs their ability to see and recognize conflicts of 
interest when they occur.  Thus, ethicality is not bounded in unpredictable or non-
systematic ways, but in systematic ways that unconsciously favor this particular vision of 
the self in our judgments.  The self is an important construct in our argument, and we do 
not challenge the individual’s capacity to recognize conflicts of interest in the abstract, or 
in the situations facing others, but rather in the situations involving the self.      Bounded Ethicality, 4 
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We argue that conflicts of interests are even more prevalent than the “visible” 
conflicts traditionally assumed by that term.  For example, visible conflicts of interest 
include the firm that collects both auditing and consulting revenues from the same client, 
as well as the investment bank that seeks investment banking business from the same 
companies rated by the firm’s equity analyst.  In contrast to these visible conflicts of 
interest, “invisible” conflicts of interests are rarely viewed as conflicts at all.  Rather, 
these situations are opportunities, and even obligations, to demonstrate loyalty and 
generosity for one’s nation, or team, or ethnic group.  We argue that these opportunities 
are, in fact, potential conflicts of interest, and even more so, when practiced by members 
of majority groups because of the large numbers of people within those groups who 
benefit.   
Three Critical Insights of the Past Century 
Simon offered bounded rationality as a “behavioral model (in which) human 
rationality is very limited, very much bounded by the situation and by human 
computational powers” (1983, page 34; see also Simon, 1957).  Fundamentally, Simon 
challenged economists’ assumption of humans as rational creatures.  Boundedness has 
since come to represent the distinction between economists’ normative and 
psychologists’ descriptive views of human decision-making.  Thaler (1996), for instance, 
extended Simon’s thinking in describing the three ways in which “Homo Economicus” 
and “Homo Psychologicus” vary.  People are “dumber, nicer, and weaker” than classical 
economic theory predicts (page 227, 230); that is, human beings have bounded 
rationality, self-interest, and willpower.       Bounded Ethicality, 5 
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Building on Simon’s work, Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky delineated the 
systematic patterns in which human beings demonstrate boundedness.  From the 1970s to 
the present, the field of behavioral decision research has identified the systematic ways in 
which decision-makers deviate from optimality or rationality in the use of information 
(Kahneman & Tverksy 1973; 1979).  This field has allowed researchers to predict, a 
priori, how people will make decisions that are inconsistent, inefficient, and based on 
normatively irrelevant information.  The central argument of much of this literature is 
that people rely on simplifying strategies, or cognitive heuristics (Bazerman, 2002).  
While heuristics are useful short cuts, they also lead to predictable mistakes (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1974).  It is the systematic and predictable nature of these biases, and what 
they reveal about the human mind, that makes them so intriguing to researchers.   
The roots of these traditions stretch back to cognitive psychology and basic visual 
and perceptual processes.  Daniel Kahneman’s acceptance speech for the Nobel Prize in 
Economics began, notably, with demonstrations of the primal limitations of our visual 
perception of lines and colors, followed by an extension of this limitation to more 
abstract forms of decision-making (2002).  Boundedness begins in perception, and 
extends to cognition.  Together, then, the insights of the bounded rationality and 
heuristics literatures have firmly established the universal computational limitations of 
the human mind.   
In recent years, another important psychological insight has emerged, inviting us 
to consider boundedness from an even broader point view.  That is, we have seen rapid 
accumulation of evidence both for the limitations of the conscious mind and the power of 
the unconscious mind.  The weight of this insight is demonstrated in the most recent     Bounded Ethicality, 6 
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Handbook of Social Psychology, which included a first-ever chapter about control and 
automaticity in social life (Bargh and Wegner, 1999).   The limitations of the conscious 
mind are highlighted in Wegner’s (2002) analysis of the role of consciousness in human 
thinking and action.  He dramatically demonstrates “the illusion of conscious will” in 
which human beings not only claim responsibility, but also intention, for actions over 
which they had exactly no control.  In a variety of tasks and contexts, humans tend to 
attribute their own behavior to premeditated intention, rather than to unconscious 
processes.   Conscious will is consistently given more credit than is due, despite robust 
evidence about its limitations.   
In parallel, the power of the unconscious mind in everyday life has become 
evident.  In a growing, multi-method body of research, automaticity has been found to 
play some role in virtually every cognitive process studied, and its inevitability has been 
cleverly termed the “unbearable automaticity of being” (Bargh and Chartrand, 1999).  
The study of unconsciousness has been made possible by the growing commitment to the 
use and development of indirect measures (Greenwald and Banaji, 1995).  
Methodologically, unconscious processes present a challenge to observe directly, 
necessitating that researchers measure outcomes of those processes that are not directly 
accessible.  Response latency is one of the most commonly used metrics in these 
methods
1, relying on the relationship between speed of response and strength of 
unconscious cognitive associations, and can be measured through millisecond-level 
response times thanks to computer-based tasks.  Another important metric is ease of 
                                                           
1 These have included, though not been limited to, the lexical decision task (LDT; e.g., 
Macrae, Bodenhausen, Milne, and Jetten, 1994), the sequential priming task (e.g., Fazio 
et al, 1995), word completions following unobtrusive priming (e.g., Gilbert and Hixon,     Bounded Ethicality, 7 
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recall, which relies on the relationship between the accessibility of a thought and the 
strength of an unconscious cognitive association, and can be measured by observing how 
a participant completes a word when only a few letters are shown.  Further, by exposing 
participants to particular stimuli subliminally (known as priming), researchers can 
compare response times or ease of recall under different conditions, such as stereotypical 
primes versus counter-stereotypical primes.   
From these methods, data have emerged and converged that allows researchers to 
contrast implicit thinking with explicit thinking.  Explicit processes are those of which 
the decision-maker is aware and can consciously endorse. Implicit processes are those of 
which the decision-maker is unaware, which are automatic, and which are not necessarily 
under the control of the decision maker.   There is growing evidence that both types of 
mental processes have an impact on behavior, and growing evidence that we overstate the 
link between the conscious system and behavior, and understate the link between the 
unconscious system and behavior (Bargh, 1997; Chugh, in press).  It is with this insight 
that we return to where we began, for a fresh look at bounded rationality. 
The Case for Bounded Ethicality 
We begin with the well-established knowledge that boundedness and heuristics 
offer computational speed, critical to the survival of human beings with less than infinite 
time for decision-making (Dawes, 1976; Bazerman, 2002).  This “cognitive” perspective 
reflects humans’ imperfections as statisticians and scientists (Dunning, 1999).  In what 
has been presented as an opposing perspective by some (Dunning, 1999), the 
“motivational” perspective suggests that individuals’ perceptions, judgments, and 
                                                                                                                                                                             
1991), and the Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, and Schwartz, 
1998).        Bounded Ethicality, 8 
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behaviors are biased towards the goal of maintaining self-worth, not just towards the 
more neutral goals of speed and efficiency.  However, we see the two perspectives as 
complementary, not opposing, in the study of decision-making (see Kunda, 1990).  The 
particular decisions we discuss here, ethical decisions, bring social forces, and thus 
motivational forces, to bear on decision-making. 
So, we accept this motivational perspective as highly relevant to the domain of 
ethical decision-making and will argue that motivational and social forces are a less 
studied but important cause of boundedness.  But our attention to the motivational 
perspective should not be interpreted as an abandonment of the cognitive, computational 
perspective.  In fact, we believe both computational limitations and motivation towards 
self-worth are both at work in the domain of ethical decision-making, consistent with the 
thread connecting perceptual, cognitive, and social bounds on decision-making.  Ethical 
decisions almost always involve consequences for self and / or others, and it is this social 
component that brings forth a surge of self-oriented motivations in ethical decision-
making.  Bounded ethicality represents that subset of bounded rationality situations in 
which the self is central and therefore, motivation is most likely to play a prominent role.     
This particular feature of bounded ethicality brings us back to the roles of 
consciousness and automaticity in decision-making.  In the bounded rationality and 
heuristics literatures, which emerged from the cognitive perspective, the researchers’ 
assumptions about the limitations of consciousness and the power of the unconscious are 
neither articulated nor disputed.   In the motivational perspective, the drive towards 
maintaining self-worth is assumed to be unconscious.   So, while the existence of 
unconscious processes may have been assumed by researchers, we attempt here to make     Bounded Ethicality, 9 
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such an assumption explicit, specific, and plausible.  In fact, much insight into the nature 
and source of boundedness, and its role in ethical decision-making, can be achieved by 
making consciousness and automaticity a focal point of our argument.   
The use of bounded rationality to address a particular type of ethical decision-
making originated with Banaji and Bhaskar (2000).  Arguing against the view that 
stereotyping is correct and rational, they linked the limitations of human cognition to 
memory and implicit stereotypes, demonstrating that such limitations lead to ethical 
failures.  These ethical failures “reveal how the interaction of specific social experiences 
and a boundedly rational cognitive architecture jointly shape thought and behavior” 
(Banaji and Bhaskar, 2000, page 154).  Our notion of bounded ethicality emerges from 
this perspective, and importantly, picks up on the importance of implicit mental 
processes.   
Specifically, social and ethical situations are particularly likely to trigger bounds 
on conscious thinking and biases in unconscious thinking, allowing us to more fully 
describe the richness of Simon’s original insight about boundedness and subsequent 
insight about conflicts of interest.  In the remainder of this paper, we propose that 
bounded ethicality is a critical constraint on the quality of ethical decision-making.  We 
propose that ethicality is bounded in systematic ways that unconsciously favor a 
particular vision of the self in our judgments.   Just as the heuristics and biases tradition 
took bounded rationality and specified a set of systematic, cognitive deviations from full 
rationality, we endeavor to take bounded ethicality and specify systematic, motivational 
deviations from full ethicality.  Similarly to the bounded rationality tradition, bounded     Bounded Ethicality, 10 
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ethicality is characterized by computational speed that eases decision-making complexity, 
but in addition, motivational forces are at work as well.    
In the bounded ethicality model, the self processes work, unconsciously, to 
protect a particular view and this view bounds ethical decision-making.  Ethical decisions 
are biased by a stubborn view of oneself as moral, competent, and deserving, and thus, 
not susceptible to conflicts of interest.  To the self, a view of morality ensures that the 
decision-maker resists temptations for unfair gain; a view of competence ensures that the 
decision-maker qualifies for the role at hand; and, a view of deservingness ensures that 
one’s advantages arise from one’s merits.  An ethical blind spot emerges as decision-
makers view themselves as moral, competent, and deserving, and thus assume conflicts 
of interest are non-issues.  Thus, conflicts, particularly the Simon-esque variety 
mentioned at the start of this chapter, are unlikely to even be recognized as conflicts by 
the person at risk.  The view of self that is preserved through bounded ethicality 
represents, in fact, exactly those qualities that one would require in order to be immune 
from conflicts of interest.  In addition, it is this view of the self that prevents the decision-
maker from even recognizing the ethical situation in which he finds himself.  And yet, 
ironically, a decision-maker is made more susceptible to conflicts of interest because of 
the persistence of his or her self-image.   
Further, the evidence suggests that we are both particularly unaware of data that 
contradicts this view of ourselves, and worse yet, particularly unaware of that 
unawareness.   This unawareness is fundamental to the notion of the “totalitarian ego” 
(Greenwald, 1980).  The ego (loosely equivalent to our use of “self” in this chapter) is an 
organization of knowledge, while the totalitarian ego displays three biases that     Bounded Ethicality, 11 
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correspond to the thought control and propaganda devices of a totalitarian political 
system.  In a totalitarian political system, “it is necessary to remember that events 
happened in the desired manner … and if it is necessary to rearrange one’s memories or 
to tamper with written records, then it is necessary to forget that one has done so” 
(Orwell, 1949, p. 176).  Similarly, the ego actively tampers and rearranges self-
knowledge so as to ensure that a certain view is maintained, but retains no conscious 
belief that such tampering has taken place (Greenwald, 1980).  Individuals are unaware 
of their unawareness.  The limitations of the conscious mind are thus critical to the 
success of the totalitarian ego.  Memory itself is distorted towards recollection of events 
“relevant to me” versus “not relevant to me,” as well as a positive construal of those 
events.   
  The “egocentric ethics” (Epley and Caruso, in press) of the totalitarian ego, 
combined with the power of the unconscious mind, make conflicts of interest difficult to 
recognize.  In the following section, we consider the susceptibility of individuals to 
conflicts of interest due to the persistent views of self as moral, competent, and 
deserving.   
Self as Moral.     People believe that they are more honest, trustworthy, ethical 
and fair than others (Baumhart, 1968; Tenbrunsel, 1998; Messick and Bazerman, 1996).  
We give ourselves more credit for our good behaviors and take less responsibility for our 
moral lapses than others would be likely to do (Messick and Bazerman, 1996).  We are 
motivated to see ourselves as ethical, and rate ourselves as more ethical than the average 
person (Tenbrunsel, 1998).  When we engage in ethically questionable behavior, we often 
justify it as self-defense (Shapiro, 1991).        Bounded Ethicality, 12 
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However, research suggests that humans continue to maintain an “illusion of 
objectivity” (Armor, 1998).  Across a series of five studies, participants consistently rated 
their own objectivity higher than that of their average peer.  In fact, approximately 85% 
of the participants believed themselves to be more objective than their average peer.  
Given the statistical improbability of 85% of participants being above their group’s 
average, the illusion of objectivity is evident.  And, participants were not simply seeing 
themselves as relatively less subjective than their peers.  Participants’ ratings of their own 
objectivity reflected a belief that they are not only viewing themselves as more objective 
relative to others, but also as objective in the absolute.  These data suggest that at least 
some percentage of human beings must be perceiving the world less accurately than they 
believe they are.  Yet, the illusion is also persistent, as participants retained their belief in 
their own objectivity, even when made aware of the phenomenon taking place.   
In one study, researchers explored the vulnerability of one’s own objectivity by 
studying how perceptions of the world depend fundamentally on how the perception 
favors or disfavors the self (Kronzon and Darley, 1999).  Participants observed an 
ethically questionable act of deception in a videotaped negotiation.  Partisans who were 
randomly allied with the victim of the ethically questionable behavior perceived the act 
as more reprehensible than did either partisans randomly allied with the perpetrator or 
neutral observers.  Despite the influence that the situation has on perceptions, research 
suggests that people underestimate differences in construal, and thus are overconfident in 
the objectivity of their predictions of the behavior of both themselves and others (Griffin 
et al., 1990).  This bias exaggerates a conflict of interest as the decision-maker retains an 
unrealistic confidence in his or her perception of data about the situation.     Bounded Ethicality, 13 
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  In another study, researchers explored the conditions under which such 
unrealistically positive beliefs are maintained or loosened (Wade-Benzoni, Thompson, 
and Bazerman, 2003).  Self-assessment of environmental sensitivity was found to depend 
on how much ambiguity surrounds the self-assessment.  Specifically, individuals 
maintain unrealistically positive beliefs about their degree of environmental sensitivity 
when their self-evaluation is difficult to disconfirm, but possess more realistic 
assessments of themselves when they are constrained by the objectivity of the evaluation 
(consistent with earlier work, e.g., Allison, Messick, & Goethals, 1989; Kunda, 1990)}. 
  For example, assessments of general beliefs such as one’s awareness of, concern 
for, understanding of, and interest in environmental issues and problems are difficult to 
confirm or disconfirm. In contrast, assessments of how well one performs on specific 
activities such as recycling, donating money to environmental organizations, and using 
energy-saving light bulbs can be checked against objective measures. If individuals 
define their environmental sensitivity in terms of general (not easily confirmable) 
behaviors instead of specific (objectively measurable) behaviors, their self-evaluations 
are likely to be inflated.  Again, human beings maintain the illusion of objectivity, thus 
putting them at risk for not recognizing a conflict of interest when it presents itself. 
Overall, this pattern of self-enhancement may provide people with an easy way 
out of engaging in more responsible societal behaviors.  Thus, when the auditor hears of 
the Moore et al. (2003) concern that their audit might be biased in ways that they are not 
even aware, the auditor feels that her objectivity will make him or her immune from the 
problems.  Babcock and Loewenstein (1997) demonstrated that even individuals’ 
interpretations of these self-serving biases are self-serving.   Study participants were     Bounded Ethicality, 14 
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taught about these biases, and the participants demonstrated a clear understanding of the 
bias by shifting their expectations of others’ objectivity.  Yet, the participants maintained 
a commitment to their own lack of bias, even while adjusting their expectations of the 
objectivity of others. 
The bias toward believing that we are more objective than reality dictates leads us 
to the conclusion that our objectivity will keep conflicts of interests from influencing our 
judgment.  In fact, in 2000, this is exactly the argument that Joseph Berardino, the CEO 
of Arthur Andersen, made while testifying before the SEC Commission.  He argued that 
the professionalism and objectivity of professional auditors solved the issue of auditor 
independence.  The SEC commissioners appeared to be influenced by this argument, 
despite its inconsistency with psychological research.  The self-as-objective argument 
carried the day, the SEC failed to act sufficiently, and the lack of auditor independence 
contributed to many corporate failures.  Professionals commonly sell their 
professionalism as immunity against being affected by conflict of interest.  We believe 
that professionalism provides only partial immunity against intentional corruption, and 
little immunity from the unconscious processes that lead decision-makers to succumb to 
conflicts of interest.   
We also extend our idea of appropriate ethical behavior to others.  Negotiators' 
expectations that their opponents will deceive them may be influenced by their own 
tendency to deceive.  Tenbrunsel (1998) varied the amount of money participants could 
win for negotiating successfully.  Participants who could win $100 expected significantly 
more deception from their opponents and were significantly more likely to deceive than 
those who could only win $1.  However, participants’ expectations of their opponents’     Bounded Ethicality, 15 
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deception depended both on their own level of temptation, as well the level of temptation 
of their opponents. 
Individuals’ perceptions of a situation can vary dramatically, even when given 
identical information, depending on their roles.  This difference occurs because 
individuals begin with their preference for a particular outcome, as motivated by self-
interests, and then justify this view on the basis of fairness through a biased perspective 
on what attributes constitute fairness (Messick and Sentis, 1983). The ethical failure is 
not in the commitment to fairness but in the biased interpretation of information 
(Diekmann et al., 1997; Messick and Sentis, 1983).   
These limitations of the conscious mind are described by Jon Haidt (2001) as the 
“emotional dog and rational tail”, in which “moral judgment is caused by quick moral 
intuitions, and is followed (when needed) by slow, ex-post facto moral reasoning.”   The 
moral reasoning essentially occurs after the fact.  This sequence suggests that “automatic 
egocentrism” precedes an evaluative moral judgment (Epley and Caruso, in press).   
  And, so, in such a tail-wagging-the-dog scenario, the view of oneself as moral is, 
at best, irrelevant (since morality occurs after the fact), and at worst, a psychological 
liability (since morality is rigged in our favor).  The belief that the self is moral leads us 
to believe that conflicts of interests will not distort our judgment, thus bounding our 
ability to recognize the conflict when it occurs. 
Self as Competent 
People perceive themselves as being better than others on a variety of desirable 
attributes (Messick, Bloom, Boldizer, and Samuelson, 1985), causing them to have 
unrealistically positive self-evaluations across a wide range of social contexts.  Broadly,     Bounded Ethicality, 16 
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people have been found to perceive themselves as being superior to others across traits 
such as cooperativeness, decision making, negotiating, rationality, driving skill, health, 
and intelligence (Babcock and Loewenstein, 1997; Kramer, 1994). 
Such inflated views are not based on abstract self-flattery.  In fact, people tend to 
define concrete “performance standards” in ways that systematically favor their own 
unique set of attributes (Dunning, 1999).   For example, Wade-Benzoni et al. (2003) 
found that people weight the environmental behaviors that they score high on to be more 
important than other environmental behaviors.  In addition, a strong correlation exists 
between how subjects rate their actions regarding the environment and their judgments of 
the importance of that action to society.  Positive illusions seem to enable people to 
believe that they are doing well relative to others on important activities, though they 
may admit to doing less well on activities they consider to be less important. These biases 
may cause individuals to think that their positive contributions to environmental issues 
are more important than the contributions of others. For example, an individual who puts 
effort into recycling, but refuses to take public transportation, may justify this decision by 
convincing him- or herself that recycling is the most important way of addressing the 
environmental crisis. Because individuals have the liberty to judge what they already do 
(which may be what is most convenient for them) as more important than behaviors that 
may call for inconvenient lifestyle changes, they are able to maintain positive views of 
themselves with minimal lifestyle adjustment.   
  By tilting performance assessments in favor of one’s own competence, 
individuals who are paid to make sound decisions are unlikely to doubt their own 
competence in doing so.  In many contexts, in fact, ethics and competence are     Bounded Ethicality, 17 
  17
intertwined.  The auditing executive who believes herself to be honest may also make the 
claim that her competence allows for the assurance of appropriate behavior.  The 
physician known for astute clinical decision-making and deep commitment to patient 
well-being is likely to resist the notion that a pharmaceutical-funded trip to Hawaii might 
influence his clinical decision-making.   In a conflict of interest, competence is often 
viewed as sufficient for avoiding sub-optimal decision-making.   
But, Taylor (1989) provides significant evidence that most people view 
themselves to be more competent than reality can sustain.   In some cases, the positive 
illusion may have benefits, as Taylor and Brown (1988) argue that positive illusions 
about oneself enhance and protect self-esteem, increase personal contentment, help 
persistence in difficult tasks, and facilitate coping with uncontrollable events. Taylor 
(1989) also argues that positive illusions are beneficial to physical and mental health.   
However, such positive illusions also put the self at risk in ethical decision-
making contexts. The ability to maintain unrealistically positive beliefs about oneself 
may be constrained to some degree by the objectivity of these beliefs, their credibility, 
and the potential to disconfirm them (Allison, Messick, and Goethals, 1989). Thus, 
people can more easily maintain the view that they are more honest than others than to 
maintain the belief that they are better tennis players or wittier cocktail party 
conversationalists.  We rarely get accurate feedback on our comparative level of honesty.  
Allison et al. (1989) reason that it is harder to have optimistic illusions when they are 
inconsistent with easily available, objective data.  In the same way, it may be easier for 
people to maintain the belief that they are fairer than other negotiators than to believe that 
they are more skillful at reaching profitable agreements.       Bounded Ethicality, 18 
  18
Thus, while Taylor may be correct about certain advantages that positive illusions 
provide to the bearer of those illusions, such self-deception can also have less positive 
consequences.  We argue that an additional harm that is created is that these illusions 
allow the illusion holder to act in his or her own self-interest, and against professional 
and normative demands.  If our vision of self as competent is not always right, and if 
competence is intended to overcome conflicts of interest, then decision-makers face a 
serious ethical challenge. 
Self as Deserving.  In allocating resources, there exists a “tension between self-
interest and the equality norm” (Diekmann et al., 1997).  Allocators of resources and 
recipients of resources make sharply different fairness evaluations based on their role.  
Invariably, collaborators such as co-authors (Taylor, 1989), spouses (Ross and Sicoly, 
1979), and joint Nobel prize winners (Harris, 1946) who are asked to quantify their 
contribution to a joint effort generate a sum greater than 100 percent (Taylor, 1989).   
  This tendency extends from the self to one’s ingroup.  In the now-classic “they 
saw a game” study, Hastorf and Cantril (1954) showed student football fans from 
Princeton and Dartmouth a film of a football game between the two schools. Both sets of 
fans watched an identical film, and yet, both sets of fans rated the rival’s team as playing 
less fairly and with less sportsmanship.  Assessments of which team was deserving 
clearly varied by in-group. 
  This tendency is not limited to football fans.  World leaders show the same bias, 
as in a failed Cold War arms race negotiation where both leaders blamed the rigidity of 
the other side (Sutton and Kramer, 1990).  President Reagan told reporters, “We came to 
Iceland to advance the cause of peace and although we put on the table the most far-    Bounded Ethicality, 19 
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reaching arms control proposal in history, the General Secretary rejected it.” Speaking 
about the same negotiation, General Secretary Gorbachev stated: “I proposed an urgent 
meeting here because we had something to propose. . . the Americans came to this 
meeting empty handed.” Kramer (1994) finds evidence in these leaders’ memoirs that 
these perspectives are more than political rhetoric, but reflect the leaders’ unconscious 
commitments to a particular view of self. 
  Diekmann et al. (1997) examined how the feeling of deservingness affects 
judgment in a simulation containing many characteristics of real-life conflicts of interest.  
MBA students were asked to allocate resources across two divisions of a company, and 
then assess the fairness of the allocation. “Advantaged” allocation recipients assessed 
these allocations as more appropriate than similar allocations that favored their rivals. In 
fact, advantaged allocation recipients made such assessments even when the imbalance in 
their own favor exceeded their own original assessment of an appropriate distribution. In 
fact, they relied on the fact that another decision-maker had made the allocation to justify 
the favorable inequality. Finally, egocentrism in assessing fairness was greater when the 
information about the deservingness of various recipients was vague, leaving room for 
interpretations favoring the self. This study suggests that decision-makers who rely on 
their own assessments of who is or is not deserving are at great risk of falling prey to a 
conflict of interest without realizing it. 
 
Distinguishing Visible and Invisible Conflicts of Interest 
So far, we have argued that psychological barriers can prevent decision-makers 
from recognizing conflicts of interest.  First, individuals view themselves as more     Bounded Ethicality, 20 
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powerful than the situation (moral, competent), and then they view any gains incurred as 
appropriate (competent, deserving).  The drive to maintain the view of oneself as moral, 
competent, and deserving is a barrier to recognizing otherwise visible conflicts of 
interest. 
Visible conflicts of interest are those traditionally thought of by laypeople, 
economists, and regulators.  In this view, the conflict is clearly in view (e.g. the auditor is 
charged with delivering a fair, potentially negative audit of the client, and simultaneously 
depends on the client for future earnings) and the decision-maker explicitly vows to 
remain unbiased by the conflict.  Evidence suggests that this vow ignores our basic 
understanding of how the human mind works, as we overestimate the influence of our 
own intention and we underestimate the influence of the psychological forces outside of 
our consciousness.  This first type of conflict of interest – the visible, yet dismissed, 
conflict of interest – is the type referred to in the types of disclosures required by many 
organizations (e.g. disclosing a financial interest in a client).    
A second kind of conflict of interest, less commonly described, is the invisible 
kind.  These more insidious, inadvertent, and self-supporting biases are still considered to 
be non-obvious and therefore unchecked.    The human tendency to favor the self and 
ingroup creates a gravitational pull towards one set of interests, even when that pull is 
quite invisible, even to the self.  For example, the conflict for an employer is his 
unconscious tendency to prefer a particular race or gender, yet his fiduciary commitment 
to shareholders to hire the best talent and his moral commitment to be egalitarian.  This 
invisible conflict of interest is even more pervasive than the visible variety.  Here, the 
conflict of interest is invisible, and therefore, dismissed.     Bounded Ethicality, 21 
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As an example, consider the role of a scholar to be a fair and objective assessor of 
ideas.  In citing work, the scholar’s obligation is to cite colleagues who have contributed 
to the current state of the understanding, rather than to favor oneself or one’s group.  
Tony Greenwald and Eric Schuh (1994) studied the citation tendencies of social 
scientists, finding that “author’s [ethnic] name category [Jewish or non-Jewish] was 
associated with 41 percent greater odds of citing an author from the same name 
category.” (page 623).  This pattern even held up with the data set was limited to 
prejudice researchers.  Presumably, these authors did not set out to exclude work by 
outgroup authors, but in essence, they did.   
The insidious power of the self is evident in data captured on-line using the 
Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, and Schwarz, 1998).  A diverse 2.5 
million tests have been taken through a publicly-accessible website 
(http://implicit.harvard.edu) in which participants are asked to make split-second 
categorization decisions of words and pictures.  The task is presented in two versions, one 
in which the categories are paired together in an attitudinally  “compatible” way (flower 
and pleasant, insect and unpleasant) as contrasted with the “incompatible” version 
(flower and unpleasant, insect and pleasant).  The difference in the participant’s speed in 
making decisions under the two conditions reflects the individual’s implicit bias (in this 
case, in favor of either flowers or insects).  More socially- and self-relevant versions of 
the test have examined implicit identity, using pairings such as “male and me” and 
“female and me” (Nosek, Banaji, and Greenwald, 2002).  The results of test-takers’ 
implicit identity tests are correlated with their results on other tests, such as implicit 
attitudes towards math.  Implicit identity is shown to correlate highly with individuals’     Bounded Ethicality, 22 
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implicit attitudes towards math, and implicit gender stereotypes about math.  That is, test-
takers with a strongly masculine implicit identity were more likely to show implicit 
gender stereotypes associating men (not women) with math, despite the fact that self-
reported, conscious attitudes towards gender and math did not reveal such patterns 
(Nosek, Banaji, and Greenwald, 2002).   
A similar pattern was found in a study of implicit racial attitudes and identity.  
There, two findings are relevant.  First, test-takers’ group membership (in a race) is 
related to test-takers’ attitudes towards race, particularly for majority group (white) test-
takers, most of whom show a bias favoring whites.  Second, the test-taker’s degree of 
implicit race identity (black or white) was correlated with the individual’s implicit 
attitudes towards blacks and whites, and implicit attitudes towards self (Greenwald, 
Banaji, Rudman, Farnham, Nosek, and Mellott, 2002).  The centrality of self and group 
membership is evident, then, especially at the unconscious level, where implicit biases 
towards oneself are related to other attitudes.  Again, this preference for self has 
important implications for conflicts of interest as decision-makers are prone to invisible 
conflicts of interest in which their bias for themselves and their own group may distort 
their ethical decision-making. 
The impact of group membership also applies to individuals in a particular 
professional role, individuals affiliated with a particular side of an issue, or individuals 
advocating for a particular group.  As we cited at the start of our chapter, Simon (1983) 
noted that “if we become involved in a particular type of activity, we will surely assign it 
a greater importance and value than we would have prior to our involvement with it” 
(page 95).  Moore et al. (2003) provide evidence that those in the auditing function are at     Bounded Ethicality, 23 
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risk when making related financial assessments.  This tendency toward biased 
information processing prevails even when people on different sides of an issue are 
exposed to the exact same information (Babcock et al., 1997).  While many argue that 
professional auditors are less subject to these biases, research has found professionals to 
be vulnerable to the same motivated biases as are other people (Buchman, Tetlock, & 
Reed, 1996; Cuccia, Hackenbrack, & Nelson, 1995; Moore et al., 2003).  When an 
auditor takes a partisan perspective, he is unlikely objectively assess the data, and is 
likely to see ambiguous data consistent with the preferences of his client (Babcock et al., 
1997; Messick and Sentis, 1979).   
The invisible conflict of interest is not only hard to see, but also deceptively easy 
to dismiss.  In many instances, people are socially rewarded for explicit favoring of the 
ingroup, such as the support of sports teams (Banaji and Greenwald, 1995) or the 
willingness to do favors for similar others (Banaji, Bazerman, and Chugh, 2003).  Human 
tendency towards such partisanship is strikingly powerful.  The tendency to “take sides 
for no reason”, or “implicit partisanship” (Greenwald, Pickrell, and Farnham, 2002) 
means that humans are always vulnerable to invisible conflicts of interest, even when 
performing altruistic acts.  
Some organizations impose nepotism restrictions (e.g. immediate family members 
can not work in the same division, or the same company), to prevent conflicting family 
and organizational interests.  While most conflicts of interest commentaries have been 
role specific, the logic in this paper also applies to situations in which individuals are 
claiming goods for their own group, selecting people for jobs, admitting students into 
school, and so on.  Conflict of interest is a critical barrier to fairness in society.       Bounded Ethicality, 24 
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Our claim that invisible conflicts of interest pervade every decision that involves 
our selves both buttresses, and challenges, the distributive justice notions of political 
philosopher John Rawls (1971).  Rawls proposed that if an individual wore a “veil of 
ignorance” that cloaked his or her identity from himself or herself, the individual would 
make decisions as if to maximize the welfare of the worst-off member of society.  This 
prediction represents the theoretical reverse of our empirical claim that individuals’ 
decision-making is always influenced by the interests of the self.  In this sense, we are 
making a claim about invisible conflicts of interest that is consistent with the essence of 
Rawls’ view of the importance of imposing a neutral stance.  However, Rawls positioned 
the veil of ignorance as a thought experiment, or theoretical condition, and in fact, the 
experimental evidence we have presented about the inescapability of the self suggests 
that the veil is only a theoretical, not actionable, construct.  We ourselves have used the 
veil of ignorance as a powerful pedagogical tool (Banaji, Bazerman, and Chugh, 2003), 
but are less optimistic about the ability of individuals to truly don the veil.  
Psychologically, the veil of ignorance is inconsistent with our notions of human bounded 
ethicality.    
Nonetheless, this is not to say that individuals from both advantaged and 
disadvantaged groups are equally susceptible to these invisible conflicts of interest.  
System Justification Theory (Jost and Banaji, 1994) demonstrates ways in which 
members of lower-status group may support, rather than resist, the status quo.  In these 
cases, the tendency to favor one’s own group may be less likely.  That said, if the 
tendency of the individual is to be implicitly partisan towards members of other groups, 
the risk of a conflict of interest still remains, but in an ironically non-self-supportive way.      Bounded Ethicality, 25 
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In our thinking about bounded ethicality, this scenario still represents a conflict of interest 
(or perhaps, it is better described as a “conflict of non-interest”).   
 
Conclusion 
 
  We have proposed that perceptual, cognitive, and social cognitive processes are 
bounded in similar, systematic ways that lead to gaps in observation and errors in 
decision-making.  Despite this robust evidence about boundedness, humans tend to view 
their own ethicality as unbounded.  In fact, decision-makers are psychologically 
motivated to maintain a stable view of a self that is moral, competent, and deserving, and 
thus, immune from ethical challenges.  Because individuals view their immunity as more 
powerful than the situation (moral, competent), and view any gains incurred as 
appropriate (competent, deserving), this view is a barrier to recognizing and addressing 
conflicts of interest.  So, ironically, decision-makers’ persistent view of their own 
ethicality leads to sub-ethical decisions.   
While we have limited our application of the bounded ethicality concept to 
conflicts of interest in this chapter, the concept can be applied to a broad set of ethical 
decisions.  Instances of power and corruption can be explained by the phenomenon as 
well, as when Bargh and Alvarez (2001) consider the roles of both conscious and 
nonconscious causes of power abuse.  In the related domain of sexual harassment, one 
researcher has found that three out of four harassers “simply don’t understand that they 
are harassers” (Fitzgerald, 1993, page 22).  Bounded ethicality limits the decision-
maker’s capacity to recognize a wide range of morally problematic issues. 
As such, decision-makers are shown to be neither ethical, nor randomly unethical, 
nor fully aware of their unethicality.  In distinctly different ways, three critical 20
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century insights point to the surprising limitations of the conscious mind and the 
surprising reach of the unconscious mind.  In fact, consciousness may play a secondary  
role in determining judgments and decisions, while much of thought, feeling and 
motivation may operate in unconscious mode.  Such pervasive operation of implicit or 
unconscious modes of thinking can compromise reaching intended ethical goals.   
Our conception of conflicts of interest as instances of bounded ethicality implies 
that, unfortunately, many of the oft-discussed solutions are inadequate in the face of the 
robust psychological barriers to recognizing conflicts where they appear.  Disclosure of 
interests addresses only visible conflicts, and even there, the conflict is not removed.  
Selecting better people is also unlikely to help, as the bias towards a particular view of 
self is not known to be easily pinpointed.  Conventional approaches towards teaching 
ethics, borne of philosophical traditions, are also unhelpful, constrained by normative 
views of the ethicality rather than the more descriptive, psychologically based 
understanding of how the mind works.
2 
While the focus of our chapter has not been prescriptive, we offer that preventive 
measures represent one important path for redress.  The best way to remove the tendency 
to favor oneself and one’s in-group in a decision is to remove oneself from the conflict, 
whether it be visible or invisible.  While such prevention may sometimes be impractical, 
we offer that the greater, immediate barrier to prevention is the illusion of objectivity that 
makes prevention seem unnecessary, rather than the practical difficulties of implementing 
the solution.  Before solutions can truly be crafted, the need for a solution must be 
                                                           
2 The philosophical tradition has begun, in some instances, to integrate the science of the mind.  Owen 
Flanagan, for example, argues for “psychological realism” in ethics, which would constrain moral theories 
by what is psychologically possible.     Bounded Ethicality, 27 
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recognized.  Our argument in this chapter is that this recognition is unlikely to occur, and 
poses a threat to ethical decision-making in the face of conflicts of interest.    
While human bounded ethicality is not an issue of honesty, it has implications for 
the trustworthiness of our decision-making.  Simon (1983), we argue, was right in the 
quotation that opened this chapter:  “Most of the bias that arises … cannot be described 
correctly as rooted in dishonesty – which perhaps makes it more insidious than if it were” 
(page 96). Conflicts of interest sometimes pit one’s honesty against one’s corrupt 
intentions. However, we have argued that honesty is not the critical bound on ethical 
decisions, such as those posed by conflicts of interest.  Rather, decisions where the self is 
central are highly prone to self-serving biases that obstruct the recognition of imminent 
ethical risks.  Motivated psychological processes put the decision-making of even “honest 
creatures” at risk.       Bounded Ethicality, 28 
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